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Abstract. “Faster, Better, Cheaper - pick any two” say critics of NASA’s current approach to scientific satellites.
As proof, they point to the recent failed or impaired small science satellites: Lewis (failed shortly after reaching
orbit), Clark (cancelled before leaving the ground), NEAR (trajectory altered due to engine shutdown) and WIRE
(failure resulting in depletion of cryogen).  Although the space industry has greatly increased their utilization of
small satellites to conduct space activities, the question remains, Is Faster, Better, Cheaper (FBC) yielding a good
return on investment?  This paper takes a historical look at traditional science missions either flown or started before
the FBC era and compares them with missions designed under this new paradigm using a variety of metrics such as
development time, cost per mission, and a newly proposed cost-effectiveness metric.  Risk is discussd in terms of
the failure rates (both catastrophic and partial) of both mission sets as well.  Conclusions are reached on the relative
merit of FBC and whether FBC is just a slogan or actually a new, valid approach for spacecraft design.
Introduction
Since becoming NASA Administrator in 1992
Dan Goldin has extolled the virtues of a Faster, Better,
Cheaper (FBC) approach to scientific satellite missions.
With nearly a decade of experience and close to two
dozen scientific spacecraft flown, enough data are
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available to conduct an objective review of the FBC
paradigm.
For the past three years, the authors have
become familiar with FBC missions by participating in
the proposal selection process for many of NASA’s
FBC programs.  These programs, which include
Discovery, Medium Explorer (MIDEX), Small
Explorer (SMEX) and Earth Science System Pathfinder
(ESSP), implement NASA’s FBC approach by dictating
both “faster” and “cheaper” by constraining schedule
duration and available funding.  While faster and
cheaper can be imposed, “better” becomes the
independent variable that is the primary question
regarding the success of FBC.
This paper describes a review of the FBC
approach through a comparison of traditional missions,
either flown or conceived prior to the FBC era, with
FBC missions initiated under the FBC paradigm.  The
purpose of the paper is to determine if FBC missions
are, indeed, “faster, better and cheaper.”
To perform this study, mission data was
collected on NASA science mission launches over the
past decade.  The data collected and the mission
selection criteria are further detailed in the Data
Collection section.  The database is provided as an
Appendix with references to the source documents.
Several metrics were developed to assess FBC
missions,.  While “faster” and “cheaper” are relatively
easy to measure, “better” is far more challenging.  For
this paper, “faster” is measured as reduced development
time,  “cheaper” is measured as reduced mission cost
while “better” is measured using several metrics.
Defining an objective measure of “better” is difficult
but, for comparison purposes, this paper measures
“better” by comparing flight rates (numbers of missions
flown), failure rates (both catastrophic and partial) and
performance according to a proposed science return
metric developed specifically for this analysis.  Overall
science mission cost effectiveness is also investigated.
In the sections that follow, the methods of data
collection are summarized and a description of the
results of applying the various metrics is provided.
Background
Several papers have been written evaluating
“Faster, Better, Cheaper” [1], [2], [3], [4], [5].  The
majority of these papers have provided a qualitative
analysis of FBC only and have not dealt with a true
quantification of the effectiveness of the FBC approach.
This paper tries to quantify the overall effectiveness of
FBC missions by using non-subjective metrics that
utilize data found in the public domain.
The quantification of how much “better” a
science mission may be is much less clear than the
assessment of “faster” or “cheaper.” For instance, how
is the effectiveness of a science mission measured given
that no two missions have the same fundamental
objectives?  Is a mission to Mars that completes 50% of
its science objectives as effective as a simple earth-
orbiter that completes 95% of its objectives? For
example, what is the relative effectiveness of $2.0B
Galileo mission compared to a $210M NEAR mission?
Is it more effective to have a single, in-depth, large
mission or a series of missions of more limited scope?
Figure 1, as taken from NASA Administrator Dan
Goldin’s speech regarding the FY2000 NASA budget
[6], tries to address the question of the effectiveness of
one large Traditional mission versus several FBC
missions using a simple comparison.  This chart
compares the relative expense of Galileo with eleven
other mall, FBC planetary missions.  This chart does
not imply that there is more scientific value in
exploring the nearest planets vs. outer planets but it
does uggest the greater variety of science afforded by
the FBC approach.  The effectiveness of one Galileo vs.
eleven FBC missions has to be determined, in the end,
by the science community.
Data Collection
Table 1 lists data parameters collected for this
analysis.  To isolate the impact of FBC on NASA, only
NASA Science Missions that meet certain criteria were
considered.  Missions that have recently been launched,
but have yet to begin their science missions (i.e.
Cassini, Stardust, FUSE, QuickScat) were not
considered because their success has yet to be
determined.  Missions that relied heavily on
international contributions (i.e. TRMM) were
eliminated from consideration due to the difficulty of
assessing foreign costs.   “Great Observatories”, such as
the Hubble Space Telescope and Compton Gamma Ray
Observatory, were not considered in this comparison
because the science objectives of these missions cannot
be easily implemented using an FBC approach.  Shuttle
science experiments were not considered because they
usually do not have funding, schedule and mass
constraints that typify FBC programs.  Technology
demonstrators, such as DS-1, were also excluded given
that their primary focus is technology demonstration,
not science.  DoD programs, such as the STEP and
MSTI series of missions, were also not considered
because our focus is on NASA missions.  Clementine,
l hough not strictly a NASA mission, has been
incorporated in the database because it was one of the
fi st examples of a FBC mission that had a strong
NASA science component as well.  The result is a set of
28 missions listed individually in the Appendix. All of
the data collected, including the cost information, are
from public sources.  These sources include various
editions of Jane’s Space Directory, satellite
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Figure 1: Comparison of Galileo Cost with Eleven Small NASA Planetary Missions
Table 1: Science Spacecraft Mission Parameters
Parameter Description
Mission Name Name given to mission at time of launch.  Some missions were renamed after launch, but
can still be found under the listed mission name.
Mission Type One of five types of science investigation missions:
     1. Astronomy & Astrophysics
     2. Space Physics
     3. Planetary
     4. Solar Physics
     5. Earth Science
Launch Year Year in which mission was launched.
Sponsor Organization or organizations that oversaw development of mission.
S/C Contractor Organization or organizations that oversaw construction of spacecraft.
Development ScheduleL ngth of time in years from contract award to launch (includes time awaiting launch, if
applicable).
Instruments Total number of instruments on spacecraft.
Launch Mass Total wet mass of spacecraft.
Total Mission Cost Total cost including the cost of the spacecraft, instruments, ground systems, launch
vehicle and mission operations.  Cost is normalized to FY98$ for comparison purposes.
Failure Type of failure, catastrophic or partial, that occurred, if any, and the cause of the failure.
Mission Duration Length of mission in years and length that instruments collected data, if different.
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compilation websites, project websites, NASA press
releases, Florida Today articles, and books from the
Microcosm Space Technology Series.  Detailed
references for all the data can be found in the
reference section.
The list of missions has been divided into
“Traditional” and “FBC” missions.  The Traditional
missions considered were those that were initiated
prior to the FBC paradigm that have been launched
since 1989.  The period beginning in 1989 was
chosen due to lack of launches from 1986 to 1989
due to the Space Shuttle Challenger accident and the
difficulty of finding reliable cost data on missions
launched prior to 1986. The result is a set of ten
Traditional missions that meet the described criteria.
FBC missions are considered to begin with SAMPEX
launched in 1992 and include all missions initiated
under the FBC paradigm.  The resulting 18 missions
represent the FBC missions investigated for this
paper.
A natural side effect of the FBC approach to
robotic space science and exploration is that a fourth
attribute, “smaller”, could be added to the slogan. As
shown in Table 2, the average and median launch
mass for FBC missions has been reduced on the order
of 85-90% compared to Traditional missions.  Given
the data, it is clear that a significant change has taken
place in terms of design philosophy resulting in
missions that have indeed become smaller in mass
during the FBC era.  Although this is a definite
characteristic of the FBC approach, many caution
that small spacecraft cannot and should not be the
only tool for conducting space science.  Some
mission objectives, such as those required by the
Great Observatories such as HST and Chandra,
cannot be achieved in a small package.  Also, flying
fewer instruments on a single platform can lead to a
reduced science benefit gained since data collected
simultaneously from several instruments together on
a single, larger platform can be used to create a richer
scientific picture.  Even with these cautions,
however, it is clear that NASA using smaller
spacecraft to implement their science missions and to
achieve the goals of FBC.
Table 2: Traditional vs. FBC Launch Mass
Mission
Class
Average
(kg)
Median
(kg)
Traditional 3013 2787
FBC 400 295
Results
Table 3 summarizes the various metrics that
were analyzed for this paper.  By design, the metrics
are based on the database parameters, and can be
directly related to one of the FBC standards.
Table 3: FBC Evaluation Metrics
Metric Units Measures
Development
time
Years Faster
Mission Cost $K (FY98) Cheaper
Flight Rate Flights/yr Better
Failure Rate Percent Better
Science ReturnInstrument-monthsBetter
“Faster” Metrics
The metric used to assess “faster” is mission
development time.  An analysis of the data, as shown
in Table 4, provides an indication that FBC missions
are indeed faster.  The data indicates that
development time for FBC missions is approximately
40-50% less than Traditional missions.
Table 4: “Faster” Metric - Development Time
Mission
Class
Average
(Years)
Median
(Years)
Traditional 7.1 6.0
FBC 3.6 3.5
As defined in Table 1, the definition of development
time includes the period from contract award to
launch.   Launch vehicle delays, therefore, are
included in the development times of these missions
and have stretched these times to be greater than they
would have been otherwise.  Some Traditional
programs were affected by the Space Shuttle
Challenger accident (namely a 3 year delay for
COBE) and the cancellation of the Centaur upper
stage (1 year for both Galileo and Magellan).
Similarly, launch delays associated with the Pegasus
esulted in increased development times for FBC
missions including HETE and FAST (1 year),
TOMS-EP (2 years) and SWAS (3 years).  The
esulting development time without launch delay is
shown in Table 5, and indicates that the FBC
development times without launch delays are much
closer to the commonly quoted goal of three years or
less.
Table 5: “Faster” Metric – Without Launch
Vehicle Delays
Mission
Class
Average
(Years)
Median
(Years)
Traditional 6.6 6.0
FBC 3.25 3
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“Cheaper” Metrics
Metrics of “cheaper”, perhaps better phrased
as “less costly”, are fairly easy to generate.  The
fundamental question is whether FBC missions are,
on average, less costly than Traditional missions.
The quantitative measure used to assess this was total
mission cost (TMC) as defined in Table 1.  On the
basis of the results from Table 6, FBC missions are
on the order of 85% less costly than Traditional
missions.
Table 6: “Cheaper” Metric – Total Mission Cost
Mission
Class
Average
(FY98$)
Median
(FY98$)
Traditional $654M $483M
FBC $96M $65M
The role of inheritance in making FBC
missions less costly should be mentioned.  The
design practices, testing techniques, knowledge of
space environments, components and technologies
inherited from Traditional missions allowed the FBC
missions to selectively apply lessons learned to
reduce cost to a minimum.  Without the path blazed
by Traditional missions, and the commercial space
business that has grown from it, FBC missions could
not be implemented with such a reduction in cost [5].
 “Better” Metrics
There are numerous ways to define what it
means for a mission to be “better.”  This paper
attempts to measure “better” by several
straightforward means: flight rates, failure rates, and
a proposed metric that may indicate science return.
The first potential metric of “better” is the
number of flights per year.  More flights per year
could represent a greater quantity and variety of
science being conducted.  Table 7 indicates that the
FBC missions have realized a higher flight rate.
Further, the forecasted annual flight rate of 5 or more
flights per year for FBC missions for the year 2000
and beyond exceeds the average and median FBC
value.
Table 7: “Better” Metric – Annual Flight Rate
Mission
Class
Average
(Years)
Median
(Years)
Traditional 1.25 1.0
FBC 2.75 2.75
Failure rates were also used to gauge the
relative effectiveness of FBC and Traditional
missions. Failures are categorized as either partial,
where the mission was impaired in some way, or
catastrophic, where the mission was completely lost
(or, as in the case of Clark, never realized).
Investigating this metric, Traditional missions
suffered only 1 catastrophic failure (Mars Observer)
ou  of 10 missions, while the FBC missions suffered
5 such failures (HETE, Lewis, Clark, WIRE and
TERRIERS) out of 18 missions.  Traditional
missions also suffered 2 partial failure (Galileo,
UARS), while FBC missions experienced 3 partial
failures (Clementine, Mars Global Surveyor and
NEAR).  Table 8 summarizes this data and indicates
that FBC missions do have a higher failure rate and,
therefore, are not “better” than Traditional missions
in terms of percentage of failures.
Table 8: “Better” Metric – Failure Rate
Mission
Class
Catastrophic
Failure Rate
Total
Failure Rate
Traditional 10% 30%
FBC 28% 44%
An aspect of the failure rate that must be
considered is the magnitude of the loss of Traditional
missions versus FBC missions.  The greater cost of
Traditional missions identifies one of the inherent
risks of having few, very costly missions and putting
all of NASA’s “eggs in one basket.”  For example,
the loss of Mars Observer is exacerbated by its
relative expense of $942M (FY98$) as compared to a
total cost of the combined catastrophic failures of
HETE, Lewis, Clark, WIRE and TERRIERS at
$215M (FY98$).
While flight rate and failure rate are easily
quantified, the primary measure of “better” for a
NASA science mission should relate to the science
return of a mission. To assess the science
return of Traditional and FBC missions, an objective
measurement was sought.  Initially a variety of
different metrics were investigated.  One proposed
metric is the amount of data generated by a science
mission.  This assumes, however, that an instrument
that collects significant amounts of data, such as
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), would be inherently
more valuable than instruments that collect less data.
A metric consisting of the number of complete
images could be developed but would not be valid for
a comparison to non-imaging instruments. Another
metric might be the number of papers published by
mission scientists. This metric, however, would favor
large, prolific teams that publish multiple papers
versus a small team that publish a few, very
significant papers.  Similarly, a metric based on the
number of “significant” findings that resulted from
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the mission would be difficult to use given that the
term “significant” is very subjective and difficult to
quantify.  It has also been suggested that the science
value of an instrument is proportional to its mass.
This metric suggests, however, that planetary
missions are inherently less valuable than Earth
orbiting missions because planetary missions
typically have much less payload mass due to the
difficulty of getting its payload to its final
destination.
To be as objective as possible, a metric was
developed to quantify “science return” using inputs
that are readily available in the public domain.  The
proposed metric uses the number of the instruments
on-board the satellite multiplied by the length of time
the instruments take data at their final destination and
is measured in terms of "instrument-months.”
Multiplying by the duration that the instrument
operates provides a surrogate for the quantity and
depth of information gathered by the instrument.  The
proposed metric also accounts for mission failures
because the failed mission’s instrument duration of
operation, and corresponding science return, is zero.
A primary assumption of this metric is that all
instruments provide equal science value.  The
rationale for this assumption is that each instrument
is placed on board a satellite to achieve a specific
scientific objective and that all scientific objectives
are of equal value.
A misleading characteristic of the
instrument-months metric is that it could identify a
high science return for a mission that could simply
fly a suite of small instruments without producing
any real science value.  This metric, if used as the
only measure of science return, could result in a
selection of this type of mission.  NASA’s current
selection process, however, would prevent a selection
of this type of mission.  NASA’s competitive science
selection process uses a peer review board of
scientists to select the most valuable science from all
proposals submitted.  Table 9 identifies that, of the
most recent round of Discovery, MIDEX and SMEX
proposals submitted, only the top 5% were selected
for implementation.  Given the number of proposals
submitted and the thoroughness of the evaluation
process, it is believed that the science of these
missions is of the highest value.
Table 9: Typical FBC Program Selection Statistics
Program Proposals
Submitted
Contracts
Awarded
Discovery 29 2
MIDEX 35 2
SMEX 52 2
Defining “better” in terms of instrument-
months provides an interesting insight into
Traditional missions.  Traditional missions are
characterized by having a large number of
instruments that operate over a relatively long
duration.  A mission such as, the Upper Atmospheric
Research Satellite (UARS) for example, carries 10
different instruments and has exceeded its design life
of 3 years by entering into its 8th year of operation.
Although one instrument, ISAMS, had a failure after
1 year in orbit and another, CLAES, depleted its
coolant after two years in orbit, the remaining
instruments continue to operate.  The total science
return to date from UARS would therefore be a total
of 804 instrument-months (i.e. 96 months x 8
instruments + 12 months for ISAMS + 24 months for
CLAES).
FBC missions, however, are characterized
by smaller spacecraft with fewer instruments that
operate for a shorter duration than Traditional
missions.  The Fast Auroral Snapshot Explorer
(FAST), for example, had four instruments on board
with an operational mission lifetime of 3 years.  The
total science return for FAST would therefore be 144
instrument-months or 18% of the science return of
UARS.
When the Traditional missions are looked at
as a whole, the science return per mission is
substantially higher than the FBC missions, as shown
in Table 10.  For the Traditional missions, the science
return value reaches a high with UARS and a low
value of zero for Mars Observer due to its failure.
The FBC missions reach a high with SAMPEX while
 failures of HETE, Lewis, Clark, WIRE and
TERRIERS all return a value of zero.  Based on the
results of this metric, Traditional missions provide
m re science return per mission than FBC missions.
Table 10: “Better” Metric – Instrument-Months
Mission
Class
Average
(Instrument-
months)
Median
(Instrument-
months)
Traditional 305 324
FBC 79 42
Although the proposed metric indicates that
FBC missions do not provide as much “science
return” as Traditional missions, other intangible
benefits of FBC missions cannot be quantified.  For
example, the introduction of multiple new suppliers
has increased the competitiveness of the spacecraft
industry and would have been difficult to achieve
under the Traditional acquisition approach due to the
risk of using a new supplier on a large, expensive
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program.  The flexibility provided by the ability to
cancel programs in trouble, such as happened with
Clark, would have been very difficult to achieve with
Traditional program due to the sheer magnitude of
the sunk cost of these programs.  The ability to
service several different science communities
simultaneously with small FBC missions does not
lead to the science “data gaps” experienced under the
Traditional approach [7].  The ability to respond
quickly to interesting scientific discoveries is also an
intangible that is difficult to measure and could not
be achieved by Traditional missions due to their long
development times.  Although not quantifiable, these
intangibles do identify other, qualitative benefits of
FBC missions.
Cost Effectiveness Metric
The results shown relative to the “faster”,
“better” and “cheaper” metrics are not entirely
unanticipated.  FBC missions should be “faster” and
“cheaper” because NASA’s FBC programs dictate
the maximum funding and schedule restrictions that
define “cheaper” and “faster.”  The reduced scope
required to meet the funding and schedule guidelines
reduce the science return of FBC missions, as
indicated by the proposed instrument-months metric.
One question that could be raised, however,
is:  Are FBC missions more cost-effective?  A stated
goal of many of the FBC program implementations is
to determine the best science value for the dollar
spent [8].  Given that we have defined science return
as instrument-months, it is a simple task to divide this
science return by the total mission cost to determine
the cost-effectiveness of each mission.  This simple
formula is shown in Equation 1.
TMC
tI
SMCE
×
=        (1)
Defining the terms in Equation 1: SMCE is
the Science Mission Cost-Effectiveness metric where
I is the number of different instruments flown, t is the
time (in months) that the instruments were operated,
and TMC is the overall total mission cost. In essence,
this metric measures the mission’s “bang for the
buck” or the amount of science gathered per unit
dollar.  Again this metric takes into account mission
failures because failed missions have a time (t) value
of zero making their respective SMCE value zero
also.
To develop a SMCE figure for the two
classes of missions, it was decided to investigate the
whole of all the Traditional missions versus the
whole of all FBC missions.   This “mission class”
SMCE figure is defined by Equation 2.
               Class
å
å
=
=
×
=
n
j
j
n
j
jj
tmc
ti
SMCE
1
1
1                  (2)
In Equation 2, the mission class SMCE is
the mission class Science Mission Cost-Effectiveness
metric where n is the number of missions, ij i  the
number of instruments on the jth spacecraft, tj is the
number of months of instrument operation for the jth
mission, and tmcj is the total mission cost for the j
th
mission.  The “mission class” SMCE is calculated in
this manner to prevent the impact of having a single
mission unfairly skew the comparison of results.
Also, similar to the failure rate calculation shown
earlier, the figure is used to assess all Traditional
missions taken as a whole vs. all FBC missions taken
as a whole.
Computing these values, the mission class
SMCE for Traditional missions is 0.52 instrument-
months/$M while the SMCE for FBC missions is
0.82 instrument-months/$M.  The data presented
indicates that FBC missions are approximately 57%
more cost-effective than Traditional missions.
Reliability
Satellite failures, both catastrophic and
partial, have been assessed for specific cause of
failure.  Four areas of consideration were used in
classifying each failure; design related launch vehicle
related, program management r lated, and unknown.
Design related failures included both software and
hardware related failures.  Launch vehicle related
failures were failures due to launch vehicle design
causing satellite failure.  Although all missions have
program management concerns, missions cancelled
primarily due to poor program management have also
been included.  Lastly, unknown failures are in which
investigation is on going or evidence is inconclusive
to determining exact reason for failure. Both
tra itional and FBC missions have been included.  As
shown in Table 11, design-related failures, hardware
in particular, proved to be the largest contributing
area of spacecraft failure.  Many of the spacecraft
failures could have been prevented with additional
testing or simulation.  Case studies have been
provided giving detail into each spacecraft failure and
possible cause.
Case Studies for Catastrophic Failures for FBC
Missions
HETE , the High Energy Transient
Experiment, launched on November 4, 1996 suffered
catastrophic failure due to separation failure from the
Pegasus XL
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Table 11: Causes of Spacecraft Failure
Cause of Failures
Design
Software 27%
Hardware 41%
Launch Vehicle 9%
Program Management 9%
Unknown 14%
third stage.  Separation failure can be attributed to
power loss in the transient bus of the Pegasus XL
third stage [9].  This power loss caused failure of 3
pyrotechnic devices to ignite.  HETE remained inside
the canister of the Pegasus XL third stage and was
unable to deploy solar arrays and lost power.  Failure
of the HETE mission can be attributed to launch
vehicle failure rather than actual satellite failure.
Lewis was launched on August 23, 1997 and
re-entered the atmosphere on September 28th due to
catastrophic failure.  The goal of Lewis, to
demonstrate advanced science instruments and new
technologies for measuring changes in topography,
was never reached as the spacecraft entered a flat
spin in orbit resulting in loss of power to the solar
arrays and eventual battery power discharge.  Ground
controllers lost contact on August 26th.  The attitude
control system design had been adapted from a
system used on the Total Ozone Mapping
Spectrometer spacecraft.  Investigation into the
attitude control system found that insufficient
analysis had been done to adapt this design to a
different spacecraft spin-axis orientation [10], [11].
Lack of knowledge about the behavior of the
spacecraft in orbit resulted in rotational perturbations,
which eventually led to an uncontrolled spin.  Lewis
mission failure could be attributed to design error.
The Clark spacecraft never made it to
launch due to cancellation of the program in February
1998.  The primary goal of Clark was to produce
black and white stereo images with resolution up to 3
m.  Primary reasons for cancellation of the program
can be attributed to a combination of concerns about
cost overruns, payload health, and an uncertain
launch schedule. Projection of cost to complete the
mission showed a cost overrun of 15 percent.  To
date, NASA had spent $55 million for the budgeted
$49 million mission [12]. The instrument to be used
on Clark had been sitting on the ground longer than
had been expected, leading to reservations about its
operation and health while in orbit.  Lastly, the
scheduling conflicts for Lockheed Martin Athena
program resulted in further postponement of the
mission. Many of the concerns leading to the
cancellation of the Clark mission related to top-level
requirements for the mission.  These top-level
requirements have been captured in the area of
program management.
WIRE , the Wide-Field Infrared Explorer,
launched on March 4, 1999 suffered catastrophic
failure due to design error and analysis.  Known
characteristics about a component in the instrument
electronic box were not considered in depth, leading
to an electrical power surge reaching the explosive
devices at startup [13].  The activation of the
pyrotechnics resulted in premature ejection of the
telescope’s cover resulting in exposure of the frozen
hydrogen (used as a coolant) and the telescopes
infrared detectors to the sun.  As the telescope heated,
the hydrogen converted to gas and expelled entirely
within a period of 48 hours from launch.  Without the
necessary cooling, the scientific mission was
considered a loss. Further testing and simulation may
have resolved these problems before they occurred.
In this instance, the WIRE mission failure could be
attributed to design error.
TERRIERS , the Tomographic Experiment
using Radiative Recombinative Ionospheric EUV and
Radio Sources satellite, built under the NASA
Student Explorer Demonstration Initiative (STEDI),
launched on May 18, 1999.  An orientation problem
with the spacecraft to allow the solar arrays full
exposure to the sun has resulted in battery discharge
[14].  The orientation error could be attributed to
possible errors in the attitude control system
software.  Although the spacecraft maybe recoverable
at a later date, it is considered at this time to be a
catastrophic failure.  Since further testing and
simulation may have prevented this occurrence, the
TERRIERS mission failure could be attributed to
design error.
Case Studies for Partial Failures for FBC
Missions
Clementine was launched on January 25,
1994 aboard a Titan IIG. Clementine's objective
included investigating the long-term effects of the
space environment on sensors and spacecraft, and to
make scientific observations of the Moon and the
near-Earth asteroid 1620 Geographos.  After
completion of the lunar mapping, Clementine's on
board computer malfunctioned on departure from
lunar orbit.  The malfunction caused a misfiring of
several thrusters and total depletion of the fuel
onboard [15].  The asteroid portion of the mission
was cancelled.  Testing of long term effects in the
space environment were continued to the end of
mission in a geocentric orbit. Partial failure of the
Clementine mission could be attributed to design
9
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error, although information as to whether this is
software or hardware related has not been determined
at this time.
NEAR, the Near-Earth Asteroid
Rendezvous, was launched on February 17, 1996.
Primary objective for the NEAR mission included
orbiting the asteroid 433 Eros in January 1999.  Due
to a burn abort that occurred in December 1998, the
NEAR will rendezvous with Eros over a year later in
February 2000.  The spacecraft aborted the scheduled
engine burn after the onboard system safety limits set
had been reached [16].  Reprogramming of these
limits was done and a re-scheduled burn occurred on
January 3, 1999.  Further testing and simulation of
the scheduled burn could potentially have solved this
problem.  In this instance, NEAR partial mission
failure could be attributed to design error.
MGS, Mars Global Surveyor launched in
November 7, 1996.  One of the unique characteristics
of this mission included using aerobraking to lower
the orbit of the spacecraft.  Flight controllers
discovered a fault in the deployment of one of the
solar array panels due to a damper failure [17].  This
resulted in a revised and less rigorous aerobraking
schedule.  Now currently in orbit around Mars, MGS
has experienced problems with the high gain
steerable antenna [18].  The antenna is now in a fixed
position in the azimuth negative direction and
investigation is under way to determine why the
antenna will not move [19]. Mechanism failure with a
loose bolt located at the stuck position could be a
possible cause for the lack of movement in the
antenna.  The lack of a steerable antenna will be
apparent when the geometry between Earth and Mars
will become unfavorable.  Failure on the hinge for
the solar panel could be attributed to hardware design
and testing.  The steerable antenna situation cannot
be attributed at this point to a given category until
further investigation is completed.
Case Studies for Partial Failure for Traditional
Missions
Galileo was launched in October 1989.
Primary objective to perform an in-depth study of
Jupiter and surroundings.  In 1991, commands were
sent to the spacecraft to open the high gain antenna.
During deployment, the antenna got stuck and
remained in a partial open configuration. After a
detailed investigation, a possible conclusion leading
to the excessive friction on deployment was caused
during shipment of the spacecraft [20].  Shipping
vibrations can reduce the effectiveness of dry
coatings and lubricant.  Ground testing simulating
shipment loads could possibly have shown excessive
wear before launch.  Since the evidence in this
investigation is inconclusive, the failure is considered
u known.
UARS, Upper Atmosphere Research
Satellite was launched on 12 September 1991 to
perform an in-depth study into changes in the Earth's
upper atmosphere.  A total of ten instruments were
included on the UARS mission, nine primary
instruments and one mission of opportunity, the
Active Cavity Radiometer Irradiance Monitor II
(ACRIM II).  A series of problems have reduced the
original mission requirements beginning with a
problem with a solar array clutch, which halted full
science operations between 2 June 1992 - 20 July
1992 [21].  Also in mid-1992, failure of a chopper
w eel drive system, resulting in failure of the
Improved Stratospheric and Mesospheric Sounder
(ISAMS) instrument.  In April 1993, the radiometer
measuring water vapor on the Microwave Limb
Sounder (MLS) failed.  Also the vertical scanning
activator showed degradation in capabilities in 1994.
Since most of the instruments were originally
functioning, this would lead one to conclude failure
in hardware design leading to partial failure of the
mission.
Case Studies for Catastrophic Failure for
Traditional Missions
Mars Observer was launched on September
25, 1992 on board a Titan III rocket. Shortly after
reaching Mars orbit, the spacecraft was lost.  Several
possible reasons for loss of spacecraft have been
proposed [22].  The primary conclusion was a rupture
of the fuel pressurization side of the spacecraft.  This
resulted in loss of propellant putting the spacecraft
into a spin.  This high spin effect subsequently put
the spacecraft into "contingency mode" disrupting the
command sequence to turn on the transmitter.
Additional causes included a power short circuit, and
over pressurization of the NTO tank due to pressure
regulator failure.  The rupture of the pressurization
side has been attributed to inadvertent mixing of fuel
and oxidizer during the helium pressurization.  In this
instance, catastrophic failure can be attributed to
hardware design error.
Cost-Effectiveness of Reducing Failures
In terms of the proposed SMCE metric, it
has been shown that the FBC missions, even with the
series of recent failures, provides a higher SCME
than that experienced by Traditional missions.
N vertheless, a reduced failure rate for FBC missions
would increase the achievable science return.  If the
cost required to reduce the number of failures is
substantial, however, the SMCE metric of FBC
missions could be reduced.
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It can be hypothesized that increased
mission expenditures could reduce the number of
failures of FBC missions.  For example, for those
missions in which a design error resulted in mission
failure, an extended development schedule or
increased staffing may have caught these items
before failure.  Failures due to poor design or
component or subsystem problems could have been
caught with an increased level of testing or increased
oversight.  Mission failures arising solely from
component failures could have been avoided by using
more costly, S-class components or by increasing the
redundancy of the system.  Additional expenditures
could also be used to acquire a more reliable launch
vehicle as well.  It could be argued that, given
enough time and money, all of the failures that FBC
mission have experienced could have been eliminated
by spending more money.  At what point, however,
does the increased expenditure focused at reducing
failures actually decrease the cost-effectiveness of
FBC missions?
Given the data collected for this paper, a
“break-even point” can be calculated where further
expenditures focused at reducing failures would
decrease the cost-effectiveness of the FBC missions.
As stated previously, the realized SMCE of the FBC
missions, including the failed FBC missions, is 0.82
instrument-months per $1M total mission cost.  The
maximum theoretical SMCE that the FBC missions
could have experienced, assuming that all FBC
missions were successful, is 0.97 instrument-
months/$M.  To calculate the SMCE “break-even
point”, a simple ratio of the maximum theoretical
SMCE to the realized SMCE can calculate the
percentage increase in total mission cost that, beyond
which, the cost-effectiveness of the FBC missions
begins to decline.  Using the data collected for this
paper, this “break-even point” is calculated at a value
of 18%.  Simply put, increased expenditures focused
at eliminating failures would increase the cost-
effectiveness of the FBC missions if the increased
mission cost to catch or avoid all failures is less than
18%.  If the cost to catch or avoid all failures is
greater than 18%, the cost-effectiveness of all FBC
missions would decrease. This simple ratio assumes
that cost would have to be increased across all
missions at an equal rate to catch potential failures
given that each mission could not anticipate, a priori,
where to focus additional spending to ensure a
successful mission.
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to assess the
relative merit of FBC missions compared to
historical, traditional NASA missions.  A variety of
metrics were evaluated to determine if FBC missions
are truly faster, better and cheaper than their
Traditional counterparts.
Are FBC missions faster?  Yes.  The data
indicates that the average development time for FBC
missions has decreased approximately 40-50%
compared to Traditional missions.  Of the FBC
missions investigated, all were developed in less time
than the average Traditional mission of 7.1 years.
Are FBC missions cheaper?  Yes.  The data
indicates that the average mission cost for FBC
missions has decreased approximately 85% compared
to Traditional missions.  Of the FBC missions
i vestigated, all were developed at less cost than the
average total mission cost of Traditional missions of
$654M.
Are FBC missions better?  Yes and no.  The
data indicates that, while average launch rate is
higher for FBC missions, the average failure rate is
also higher.   The proposed science return measure
also indicates that the Traditional missions have a
greater science return.  Given the reduced science
return and higher failure rate of FBC missions, FBC
missions cannot be considered “better.” Based on the
data gathered for this evaluation, the saying of
“Faster, Better, Cheaper – pick any two” is true only
if “faster” and “cheaper” are chosen.  The data shows
t at to achieve faster and cheaper, the mission must
give up “better” by reducing scope and science return
on a per mission basis.
In an effort to roll all terms into a defining
cost-effectiveness metric, the proposed science return
metric was divided by the total mission cost to
determine the science “bang for the buck.”  The data
indicates that the mission class Science Mission Cost-
Effectiveness (SMCE) for FBC missions is 74%
higher than for Traditional missions.  Although
SMCE is a relatively simple metric, it does indicate a
relative cost-effectiveness improvement of FBC
missions over Traditional missions.
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Appendix
*Failure Type
1. Antenna deployment
2. Multiple component failure
3. Propulsion component failure
4. Computer malfunction
5. Array stuck on deployment
6. Lack of antenna movement
7. Software related
8. Pegasus failure
9. ACS error
10. Project cancelled due to cost overrruns
11. Electrical power surge causing premature deployment of telescope cover
12. Unable to orient to sun
Mission Name Mission Type Lauch Year Sponsor S/C Contractor Development Schedule
(years)
Galileo Planetary 1989 NASA, JPL JPL, Ames 11
Magellan Planetary 1989 NASA, JPL Martin Marietta 7
COBE Astronomy & Astrophysics 1989 NASA GSFC, Ball 12
UARS Earth Science 1991 NASA, GSFC GE Astro Space, Farichild 6
Mars Observer Planetary 1992 NASA, JPL GE Astro Space 6
EUVE Astronomy & Astrophysics 1992 GSFC, U of Ca Space Sciences LabGSFC, Fairchild 6
TOPEX/Poseiden Earth Science 1992 NASA, JPL, CNES JPL, Fairchild, Alcatel 5
Wind Space Physics 1994 NASA, GSFC Martin Marietta 6
XTE Astronomy & Astrophysics 1995 NASA GSFC 4
Polar Space Physics 1996 NASA, GSFC Lockheed-Martin 8
SAMPEX Space Physics 1992 NASA GSFC 3
Clementine Planetary 1994 NASA, BMDO NRL, LLNL 1.5
Mars Global Surveyor Planetary 1996 NASA Martin Marietta 1.5
Mars Pathfinder Planetary 1996 NASA, JPL JPL 3
NEAR Planetary 1996 NASA JHU/APL 4
HETE Astronomy & Astrophysics 1996 MIT Center for Space Research AeroAstro, LLC 6
FAST Space Physics 1996 NASA, GSFC GSFC 4
TOMS-EP Earth Science 1996 NASA, GSFC TRW, Perkin Elmer 5
ACE Space Physics 1997 GSFC, CalTech JHU/APL 4
SeaStar/Orbview 2 Earth Science 1997 NASA OSC, Hughes 6
Lewis Earth Science 1997 NASA TRW 3
Clark Earth Science 1998 NASA CTA, Martin Marietta 4
Lunar Prospector Planetary 1998 NASA Lockheed 2.5
TRACE Solar Physics 1998 Stanford Lockheed Martin 2
SNOE Space Physics 1998 GSFC LASP 3
SWAS Astronomy & Astrophysics 1998 NASA GSFC 7
WIRE Astronomy & Astrophysics 1999 NASA, JPL GSFC 2
TERRRIERS Space Physics 1999 BU Center for Space Physics AeroAstro, LLC 4
Mission Name # of Instruments Launch Mass Total Mission Cost Failure* Mission Duration (months) Refs
(kg) (FY98$M) Catastrophic Partial Instrument Total
Galileo 15 3881 2036.57 n y,1 48 96 20,21,30
Magellan 1 3444 730.08 n n 48 60 20,21,30,43
COBE 3 2265 304.75 n n 10 12 20,21,30
UARS 10 6795 921.06 n y,2 96 96 20,21,24,41
Mars Observer 7 2573 941.68 y,3 n 0 12 20,21,22,25
EUVE 4 3275 407.40 n n 96 96 20,42
TOPEX/Poseiden 5 2402 558.72 n n 96 96 20,24,46
Wind 8 1195 187.36 n n 36 36 20,24,44
XTE 3 3000 203.07 n n 24 24 23,24,26,31,40,45
Polar 12 1300 245.14 n n 36 36 20,25
SAMPEX 4 258 76.67 n n 84 84 20,21,27,31,41
Clementine 11 424 89.76 n y,4 2 7 20,25,37,42
Mars Global Surveyor 6 651 281.09 n y,5,6 24 72 18,20,33,42,46
Mars Pathfinder 3 890 273.98 n n 4 10 26,47
NEAR 6 818 216.30 n y,7 24 48 16,20,21,25,38
HETE 6 128 31.79 7,8 n 0 0 9,20,21,37
FAST 4 420.5 61.80 n n 36 36 20,21,25,27,41
TOMS-EP 1 248 111.24 n n 36 36 20,31,42,46
ACE 10 785 164.59 n n 24 24 21,29,32,48,49
SeaStar/Orbview 2 1 309 43.69 n n 120 120 20,24,25,42
Lewis 3 385 66.04 y,9 n 0 0 10,20,24,25,39,42
Clark 4 --- 55.00 y,10 n 0 0 12,20,42
Lunar Prospector 6 295 68.68 n n 18 18 20,23,25
TRACE 1 250 49.00 n n 15 15 21,26,28,34,41
SNOE 3 132 12.00 n n 18 18 24,25,42,50
SWAS 2 288 64.00 n n 24 24 21,25,27,36,41
WIRE 1 250 50.00 y,11 n 0 0 20,23,31,36,37,45
TERRRIERS 9 272 12.30 y,12 n 0 0 20,24,28,35,42
